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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are deeply embedded
infrastructures that have significant cyber and physical
components that interact with each other in complex ways.
These interactions can violate a system’s security pol-
icy, leading to unintended information flow. The physical
portion of such systems is inherently observable, and, as
such, many methods of preserving confidentiality are not
applicable. This fundamental property of CPSs presents
new security challenges. To illustrate this, a vehicle com-
posed of an embedded computer system, its operator, and
its environment show how information is disclosed to an
observer that is watching from the outside.
The example is made of up a vehicle with an automated
engine management system (smart cruise control) traveling
across some terrain with an observer watching the vehicle.
The information that is to be protected is the controller of
the vehicle. This model is analyzed using formal models
of information flow, namely nondeducibility and noninfer-
ence. The vehicle’s operation, in context with the terrain
of the road, discloses information to the observer. Context
is important; the same information that was disclosed with
one terrain type is hidden with a different terrain.
This problem, its methodology, and results uncover
problems, and solutions, based on the theory of informa-
tion flow, to quantify security in these new types of systems.
Keywords-Road Vehicles; Security; Information Flow
I. Introduction and Motivation
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is an emerging term
for a system with deeply embedded computation enmeshed
with a physical system [1]. Potential CPSs include high-
confidence medical devices and systems, traffic control
and safety, advanced automotive systems, process control,
energy conservation, environmental control, avionics, in-
strumentation, and critical infrastructure control systems
(water and gas resources, for example). These systems
share a common vulnerability, since they inherently control
a physical system; confidentiality is difficult to secure.
Thus, security in such systems must be described within
the physical and cyber context of its operation [2].
Automated vehicles within a highway system form an
emerging CPS domain with just such security require-
ments. Vehicles have communication capabilities whose
primary goal is to extend the vision of the driver beyond
line of sight. Four major groups of applications [3], [4] are
those of a) vehicle-to-vehicle traffic, b) vehicle-to infras-
tructure, c)vehicle-to-home and d)routing based applica-
tions. These are classified on the basis of usage and com-
munication patterns into either safety related or comfort-
related (commercial) applications (such as location-based
services) [5]. These CPS vehicles have emerging require-
ments for security [6].
Many cyber security mechanisms for vehicle infrastruc-
tures are limited to access control and key management
schemes to maintain integrity and privacy [7] to support
a wide range of security requirements [8]. While some
authors downplay privacy as a concern [4] or even as
achievable, others stress the need for privacy through
anonymity [3], implemented through the use of multiple
keys [7]. All of this work restricts itself to authentication
schemes and the use of keys to protect the cyber privacy.
To address privacy of the driver and confidentiality of
the EMS requires development and analysis of a secu-
rity model within the system context, fundamentally, a
driver, in a vehicle, on a road. This is motivated by the
need to determine (or hide) if a vehicle is participating
in an automated highway system, or is being operated
independently; if the vehicle is pretending to operate under




automated control, but is not, it presents a security risk.
To address this issue, this paper considers a complement to
traditional analysis by analyzing information flow within
the operational context as a fundamental security model.
A specific system chosen as a model problem in this pa-
per, representative of these CPSs, is the automotive Engine
Management System (EMS). An EMS is composed of a set
of microprocessors that take real time input from sensors
and provide output to actuators distributed around different
components of a vehicle. The most common of these units
include transmission control units, traction control, brake
control, etc. A Controller Area Network (CAN) is used to
communicate between the devices. Composing this system
of controllers with a connection to the CAN device allows
all the components work together to provide the driver
with enhanced safety, ease of control, and timely response
of the vehicle [9]. This coordination results in a CPS
with confidentiality requirements [10]. While integrity and
availability are vital concerns in operation of the EMS,
this paper addresses confidentiality of the system within
the context of its environment. Knowing the state of the
EMS exposes the existence of critical system control of the
vehicle. Determining these controls and preventing their
proper execution can reveal confidential information about
the driver. The vulnerabilities are due to the disclosure
of information. Classic models of confidentiality (such as
strict secrecy through encryption, for example) are not ap-
propriate for cyber physical systems as they only protect its
cyber portion. Inherently, the system discloses confidential
information through its physical actions. Two formal infor-
mation flow properties, noninference, and nondeducibil-
ity [11] are particularly appropriate for examining cyber
physical systems [12].
The main contribution of this paper is to show how to
determine security within the context of the vehicle’s oper-
ation and show, fundamentally, when security is violated,
and when it is preserved. Velocity, terrain, and obstructions
form a context to send information from the vehicle’s
EMS to an outside observer. Coupled with the knowledge
of the world, this information is sometimes adequate to
gather enough information in order to reveal knowledge
about the driver, but under certain contexts, the context,
itself, provides obfuscation of system information. Similar
analogies and analysis can be made with oil/gas (observing
flow in a pipe) [13], aircraft control (observing a physical
motion change), or power flow along power lines [12].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 states the method to conduct CPS analysis and
the model problem; Section 3 is the information analysis;
and Section 4 re-emphases the significance of the problem.
II. Methodology and Problem Statement
A. Methodology
The inference of confidential information from observ-
able information flow has high potential to cause critical
information leakage, therefore, the vehicle’s information
flow should be carefully analyzed. Existing security mod-
els [11] that analyze multi-level security system behavior
are used. Specifically, trace-based information flow models
are conceptually attractive for CPSs. Informally, a legal
trace of a system is a record of its events during its
execution. The collection of all legal traces represents
possible system behavior. Both high-level and low-level
events are present in these traces. By restricting events to
only those that are visible to an observer in the low-level
security domain (low-level events) or by purging events
in the high-level security domain (high-level events) from
these traces, two interesting properties result
Nondeducibility Model: a system is considered nonde-
ducibility secure if it is impossible for an observer in
the lower-level security domain, through observing visible
events, to deduce anything about the sequence of high-level
input events. By restricting the observable trace to only
those events that are visible, if another trace can always
be found with the same high-level events, the system is
nondeducibility secure - i.e. a observation in the low-level
security domain is compatible with any of the high-level
input events [11].
Noninference Model: a system is considered secure if
and only if for any legal trace of system events, the trace
resulting from a legal trace purged of all high-level events
is still a legal trace of the system [11].
Nondeducibility is particularly appropriate for a CPS;
for most systems it is clear that some sort of high-level
actions are present, but it is enough to obfuscate which
particular actions are occurring [11]. Noninference is a
stronger property that indicates what is observed could
have occurred with, or without, any high-level events.
Note that these are weaker than the traditional notion of
confidentiality, namely, noninterference, which states that
an observation of a trace is exactly the same with or
without high-level actions. This latter property is nearly
impossible to achieve in CPSs [12].
The methodology for approaching information security
for a CPS consists of the following steps:
1) Determine system function
2) Determine security partitions
3) Develop system traces
4) Apply information flow theory
The last two steps are particularly challenging in a CPS
as both the cyber and physical semantic meaning must be
merged into a single trace/analysis.
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Figure 1. Information flow diagram of an EMS.
The observer deduces high-level security do-
main information from visual cues.
B. Problem Statement
In a vehicle control is maintained either by the EMS
or by the driver. For the sake of presentation, the problem
is to preserve the confidentiality of the two control types.
Confidential information is shown in Table I to analyze the
information flow in the EMS.
Table I. Confidential information in EMS
Data Type source Function
Driver vehicle operator
Cruise Control ECU Automatic control
Crash Avoidance ECU Automatic control
Control Type source Function
Sensor Information Digital Sensor Network Sensor information giving
(CAN) input into the EMS
The EMS is made up of two security levels (shown in
Table II). In the high-level security domain, communica-
tion is done through a CAN bus and is responsible for the
control of the vehicle. In the low-level security domain,
the speed information causes implicit communication due
to visual queues. The unobstructed view of the vehicle
reveals information about the vehicle such as speed, which
makes this the implicit communication. The failure of
confidentiality occurs when observers from the low-level
security domain observe or deduce information from the
high-level security domain as depicted in Figure 1.
III. Analysis of EMS using security models
Using the appropriate security models will show how
the EMS can divulge information to the low-level security
domain. The following analysis examines the vehicle’s op-
eration as a composition of both the driver (manual inputs)
Table II. Security levels in EMS
Security Level Security Entities Reasons
High-Level EMS Responsible for aiding the control of the
vehicle for the driver
Driver Relays input to the EMS by the use of
actuators, levers and buttons
Low-Level Physical Everything exterior to the vehicle
Observer The entity watching information flow






h1 Driver maintains gas flow
h2 Cruise control maintains speed
h3 Driver increases gas flow
h4 Cruise control increases speed
h5 Driver slows current gas flow
h6 Cruise control decreases speed
h7 Driver resumes original gas flow
and the automated control provided by the EMS over two
different types of terrain, flat and hilly 2. The EMS’s cruise
control is further segmented into three variants:
 Standard Cruise This is a typical cruise control of
an automobile, it reacts to changes in terrain, but not
perfectly, it may speed up or slow down momentarily.
 Perfect Cruise This is a cruise control that maintains
speed exactly over all terrain. It is not a realistic
device, but is included to prove counterexamples.
 Random Cruise This is a variant of Standard Cruise
with random variability build into it.
Events in Table III are observed at e1 ... e7 in Figure 2
(e2, e3 and e5, e6 differ only the the direction of vehicle
travel). Trace analysis is used to develop legal traces of
the vehicle in its context and analyzed with respect to two
security models.
For each of these proofs, the event that the vehicle
changes or maintains velocity is treated as an independent
set of traces. If one of the traces fails to hold the property
then it fails for the entire scenario.
Theorem 1. Vehicle operation is nondeducibility secure
when traveling up hill for standard and random cruise
controls.
Proof: The EMS is a non-deterministic system which
is built from the traces in Table IV: For each trace the first
and third events are low-level events and the second event
is a high-level input event into the system.
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Table IV. Trace list for the Standard Cruise
Scenario Trace
Traveling Up Hill (e2,e6)
Maintain Speed fl1h3l1g, fl1h4l1g
Speed Reduction fl1h1l2g, fl1h2l2g,
fl1h5l2g,fl1h6l2g
Traveling Down Hill (e5, e3)
Maintains speed fl1h5l1g, fl1h6l1g
Increases speed fl1h1l3g, fl1h2l3g,
fl1h3l3g, fl1h4l3g
Traveling on Flat Surface (e1,e4,e7)
Maintains speed fl1h1l1g, fl1h2l1g
Increases speed fl1h3l3g
Decreases speed fl1h5l2gg
Table V. Trace list for the Perfect Cruise
Scenario Trace
Traveling Up Hill (e2,e6)
Maintain Speed fl1h3l1g
Speed Reduction fl1h1l2g, fl1h5l2g
Traveling Down Hill (e5,e3)
Maintains speed fl1h5l1g
Increases speed fl1h1l3g, fl1h3l3g
Traveling on Flat Surface (e1,e4,e7)
Maintains speed fl1h1l1g, fl1h2l1g
Increases speed fl1h3l3g
Decreases speed fl1h5l2gg
Standard Cruise: This scenario is built from the traces
in Table IV. The vehicle, as it travels up the hill, is
nondeducibility secure because for any trace the low-level
output events are identical regardless of the controller of
the vehicle. The traces are either l1l1 or l1l2. There are
multiple high-level events that the vehicle either speeds
up, slows down, or maintains speed. Because of this fact,
there is no high-level event trace that leads to a unique set
of low-level output events to the observer.
Perfect Cruise: This scenario is built from the traces in
Table V. Because the perfect cruise does not allow for
any deviation from the set speed, it is more revealing of
the controller of the vehicle. The driver has the ability to
change speed or due to a lack of awareness changes speed,
this leads to a divulgence of information and violates the
nondeducibility property.
Random Cruise: This scenario is built from the traces in
Table VI. Traveling up hill the random cruise is able to
perform the same actions as a driver, so for each case of
the vehicle with a change in velocity or maintenance of
the velocity the controller is nondeducibility secure. The
random perturbations of the velocity are able to hide the
fact that a non-perfect driver reveals the controller of the
vehicle.
Theorem 2. Vehicle operation is nondeducibility secure
when traveling down hill for standard and random cruise
Table VI. Trace list for the Random Cruise
Scenario Trace
Traveling Up Hill (e2,e6)
Maintain Speed fl1h3l1g, fl1h4l1g
Speed Reduction fl1h1l2g, fl1h2l2g,
fl1h5l2g,fl1h6l2g
Traveling Down Hill (e5,e3)
Maintains speed fl1h5l1g, fl1h6l1g
Increases speed fl1h1l3g, fl1h2l3g,
fl1h3l3g, fl1h4l3g
Traveling on Flat Surface (e1,e4,e7)
Maintains speed fl1h1l1g, fl1h2l1g
Increases speed fl1h3l3g, fl1h2l1g
Decreases speed fl1h5l2g, fl1h2l1g
Figure 2. Comparison of how the events are
captured on differing terrains.
controls.
Proof: The EMS is a non-deterministic system and
for given low level inputs and controllers there are several
representative traces. For each trace the first and third
events are low-level events and the second event is a high-
level input into the system.
Standard Cruise: This scenario is built from the traces
in Table IV. The vehicle, as it travels up the hill, is
nondeducibility secure because for any trace the low level
outputs are identical regardless of the controller of the
vehicle. There are multiple high level actions that the
vehicle either speeds up, slows down, or maintains speed.
The traces are either l1l1 or l1l3. Because of this fact, there
is no event trace that leads to a unique set of outputs to
the observer.
Perfect Cruise: This scenario is built from the traces in
Table V. Traveling down hill reveals the controller much
in the same way as going up hill. Since it is unreasonable
for the vehicle to change its speed while on a perfect cruise
control it reveals that the driver is in control of the vehicle.
There is a unique trace for any sort of speed variation, so
this violates the nondeducibility property.
Random Cruise This scenario is built from the traces in
Table VI. The random cruise will vary the speed in such
a way that it will average out at the target speed. This is
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feasible if the cruise has as much control over the vehicle
as the perfect cruise but alters the velocity enough to make
it reasonable at different discrete events that the velocity
can vary.
Theorem 3. Vehicle operation is not nondeducibility se-
cure when traveling across a flat terrain.
Proof: The EMS is a non-deterministic system rep-
resented by a trace of events. For each trace the first and
third events are low-level events and the second event is a
high-level input into the system.
Standard Cruise: Refer to the traces in Table IV. The
vehicle, as it travels across a flat surface, is not nonde-
ducibility secure because for any trace the low level outputs
are not always identical. In the case that the vehicle speeds
up (fl1h3l3g) or slows down (fl1h5l2g), there is no other
way to explain these actions than to say that the driver
is operating the vehicle in these cases. A cruise control
would not act in this manner.
Perfect Cruise: Refer to the traces in Table V. Traveling
across the flat plane with a perfect cruise control is the
same case as a standard cruise control.
Random Cruise Refer to the traces in Table VI. The
random cruise has the most substantial amount of effect
on the case of the flat terrain. For both the standard cruise
and the perfect cruise, it is not nondeducibility secure for
the reason that it is unreasonable to have any differences
of speed from the set velocity. The random cruise adds
small changes in velocity to simulate a human driver,
implying that they are not perfect. As a result, there is
no unique trace for the cases of increasing or decreasing
speed showing nondeducibility.
Discussion The results from these examples reveal inher-
ent obfuscation even in the presence of observable events.
When the low-level output events correlate with a low-
level input event at the physical level, the controller of
the high-level input events is hidden from the observer.
For example, as the vehicle travels up the hill, the event
of the vehicle slowing down from its initial velocity can
be explainable in two ways; the driver did not maintain
the proper amount of gas flow to give the vehicle enough
force to make it up the hill or the cruise control could not
compensate for the steep grade of the hill. It follows that
there is a trace for both the driver and the cruise control
that allow the vehicle to slow down while traveling up hill.
Adding a perfect cruise in the system shows how
any deviation in speed from the target speed reveals the
existence of the driver. Having some variation as added
by the random cruise is beneficial to the system as a
whole since a human is imperfect as a driver. By the
addition of the randomized cruise a simulation of a driver
is added into the system, and this addition solves the
problem of having unique traces for a given case that is
nondeducibility secure. Generally a driver can not maintain
a constant speed over all terrains while a perfect cruise
control has the ability to do this.
Theorem 4. Vehicle operation is not noninference secure
when traveling down hill or traveling up hill.
Proof: : The EMS is a non-deterministic system which
is built from the following traces: For each trace the first
and third events are low-level events and the second event
is a high-level input into the system.
Standard Cruise: The vehicle, as it travels down the
hill, is noninference secure because for any trace the low-
level traces are identical regardless of the controller of
the vehicle. After a purge of the high-level events, in the
case of maintaining speed the resulting trace is fl1l3g,
while increasing speed the resulting trace is fl1l3g. In
terms of traveling up hill the resulting traces are fl1l2g,
while reducing speed the resulting trace is fl1l2g. It is not
noninference secure with respect to there being a controller
when the vehicle is maintaining speed, but this does not
reveal who is in control of the vehicle. It is noninference
secure in the case that the vehicle is increasing speed while
traveling down hill and decreasing speed while traveling
up hill when the high level input is purged from the traces.
Perfect Cruise: After purging the high level events with
respect to the perfect cruise, it follows much in the same
way as the standard cruise. Once the hight level events are
purged, the low level trace would result with fl1l3g in the
down hill trace and fl1l2g for the up hill trace. Having a
controller violates the noninference property.
Random Cruise Including a random cruise in this envi-
ronment keeps the vehicle controller noninference secure.
There is a controller visible to the observer, but it cannot
be inferred whether the control is from the driver or the
cruise control. This is caused by there being no unique
mappings to an individual controller after the removal of
the high level events.
Theorem 5. Vehicle operation is not noninference secure
when traveling across a flat surface and increases or
decreases speed.
Proof: : The EMS is a non-deterministic system where
for each trace the first and third events are low level events
and the second event is a high level input into the system.
Standard Cruise: The vehicle, as it travels along the road,
is not noninference secure because for any trace after the
purge of the high-level events, the low-level traces are not
identical. After a purge of high level events, the resulting
trace for the vehicle while maintaining speed is fl1l1g, the
resulting trace from the vehicle increasing speed is fl1l2g,
and finally the resulting trace for the vehicle decreasing
speed is fl1l3g. This rule is violated both in the case that
the vehicle increases and maintains speed. The reason is
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after the controller is removed from the system the vehicle
will begin to slow down due to friction and gravity on the
vehicle.
Perfect Cruise: In this case the perfect cruise acts the
same as the standard cruise.
Random Cruise After the purge of all the high-level
events the resulting trace is fl1l3g. It is noninference secure
in terms of the control of the vehicle.
Discussion The outcome of this analysis shows another
natural obfuscation of high-level events when the low-level
events correlate with the physical design of the system. For
example, if the vehicle traveling down the hill has a high-
level action removed from the trace, it is reasonable for the
vehicle to slow down or remain a constant speed. On flat
terrain, the control (EMS or human) of the vehicle can be
inferred because if the vehicle either speeds up or slows
down then it is not the cruise control that is managing the
operation of the vehicle.
The perfect cruise does little to improve the results. The
random cruise improves the ability to infer which control is
active in the system. With its addition, it masks the control
by adding additional traces into the system that guarantee
that there is no unique mapping of traces at the low-level.
IV. Conclusions and Significance
This paper showed that while CPSs have an inherent
information flow leak due to inherent observability, they
contain natural information flow obfuscation of their high
level events. For the specific example of an EMS system of
a vehicle and the driver of an automobile there were some
cases in which the EMS in its environment satisfies the
properties of noninference and nondeducibility. In order
to accomplish this, there was a natural obfuscation of the
high-level events due to the context of the physical world
and the response of the vehicle. The cases in which the
confidentiality of the vehicle and the driver did not satisfy
the information flow properties occurred when it was not
reasonable for a controller to take some action that was
uncharacteristic of the system. The natural obfuscation is
significant in the CPS domain because it provides a means
to hide information within the context of an inherently
observable system.
This analysis involving the EMS and the driver is
a common example of many CPSs that use the lowest
security level as a medium of information transfer. There
is no way to avoid the use of this medium and is significant
to the analysis of these infrastructures. Thus, the approach,
methods, and security models of this paper quantify secu-
rity analysis for cyber-physical systems.
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